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China’s Foreign Investment and Assistance: Implications for Cambodia’ 
Development and Democratization 
Kheang Un 
 
Abstract 
 
With a strong economy and newly acquired confidence following three decades of rapid 
economic expansion, China has pursued an outward looking policy based upon foreign 
direct investment, development assistance and trade targeting particularly the developing 
world. Such expansion has drawn concerns over its impact on human rights, 
democratization and the environment. This paper assesses these concerns by examining 
Sino-Cambodia relations over the past sixteen years. It concludes that while trade, 
development assistance, and investment have had positive effects on Cambodia’s economic 
development, concerns that these engagements have derailed deeper democratization in 
Cambodia are not deterministic. Cambodia’s authoritarian trajectory is less a product of 
China’s engagement and more of the Cambodian elites’ defiance of Western efforts at 
democratic promotion and belief in state developmentalism—economic prosperity with 
tight political control. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Following three decades of rapid, sustained economic growth, the People’s Republic 
of China (hereafter PRC or China) has emerged as a strong economic and political player in 
Asia and beyond. With a strong economy and newly acquired confidence, China has 
expanded its engagement with multilateral institutions, regional organizations and 
developing countries. China’s engagement with developing countries rests on its outward 
foreign direct investment, development assistance and trade. Although China’s engagement 
in the developing world has contributed to the latter’s economic growth, such engagement 
has raised concerns over its negative impact on human rights, democratization, and the 
environment. Reactions to such concerns have been reflected in Sino-Cambodian relations 
through a complex intertwining in areas of trade, investment, diplomacy, development 
assistance, and culture over the past decade. Although it is agreed that China’s close 
engagement has contributed to opening up Cambodia to the regional and global economy 
and thus economic growth, critics have charged that these developments have not only 
moved Cambodia deeper into China’s sphere of influence but also increased the power and 
legitimacy of the autocratic regime in Phnom Penh, thereby hindering Western countries’ 
efforts to promote deeper democratization.  
 This paper addresses the implications of China’s trade and development assistance 
for Cambodia’s economic growth and democratization. It is divided into four sections; the 
first  traces the historical background of Sino-Cambodian relations, including China’s 
support for the murderous Khmer Rouge regime. Second, the paper examines Beijing’s 
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strategic deployment of soft power and its application to Cambodia. Third, it analyzes 
China’s investment and assistance and its impact on Cambodia’s economic and democratic 
development. This paper concludes that while Chinese trade and development assistance 
have had positive effects on economic development in Cambodia, its impact on 
Cambodia’s democratization is not deterministic. Critics who blame China for derailing 
deeper democratization in Cambodia overlook first the nature of Cambodia’s domestic 
politics and the appeal of China’s soft power, and as well as the complexity of the relations 
between Cambodia and the donor community and the latter’s often fractured efforts to 
promote democracy in Cambodia. 
 
 
Historical Background 
 
Sino-Cambodian post-colonial diplomatic relations began in 1958 as Cambodia 
searched for friends who could help it navigate the conflict that would engulf Indochina 
over the next two decades. Cambodia’s search coincided with China’s quest for influence in 
the Third World. Following a meeting between Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Premier 
Zhou Enlai at the 1955 Bandung Conference of the non-aligned movement, the PRC and 
Cambodia established formal diplomatic relations in 1958. China soon became one of 
Cambodia’s major patrons in the latter’s quest for neutrality (Sihanouk, 1958-1959) until 
Prince Sihanouk was disposed by a military coup in 1970.  
The PRC, after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, was concerned about Vietnam’s 
attempt to cultivate a unified Indochina. This troubled the PRC not because it was 
concerned about the Vietnamese threat per se, but because the PRC feared the fall of 
Indochina into the hands of a pro-Soviet Vietnam. This would eventually enable the Soviet 
Union to encircle China from multiple fronts (Ross, 1988, p. 40). As a consequence, the 
PRC offered military assistance, including military advisors, to Democratic Kampuchea 
(DK) which ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 before it was toppled by the Vietnamese 
army (Kiernan, 1991, pp. 132-33; Short 2006). The DK regime undertook an extremely 
radical, utopian revolution copying distorted elements of Moa Zedong’s Great Leap 
Forward and Cultural Revolution to construct the Khmer Rouge version of a Super Great 
Leap Forward. In the course of the social, cultural, psychological and physical destruction 
of Cambodia, the DK caused an estimated 1.7 million deaths from starvation, execution, 
and overwork, the highest per capita rate of mass killing in modern world history (see 
Chandler, 1991; Kiernan, 1995; Becker, 1998). 
As news about the DK’s “killing fields” spread worldwide, the legitimacy of the 
DK’s resistance to the Vietnamese backed  People’s Republic of Kampchea (PRK) could 
not be justified; therefore, a more acceptable anti-Vietnamese/PRK coalition was needed. 
China, the United States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—
overlooking the DK’s grave human rights violations—backed the Khmer Rouge and two 
other resistance movements against the Vietnamese army and Vietnamese backed 
government in Phnom Penh. Within this context, political scientist Muthia Alagappa (1993, 
p. 201) argues, the Cambodian conflict emerged as “bilateral (Khmer-Vietnamese) and 
domestic (intra-Khmer) became internationalized by the dynamics of deep-seated Thai-
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Vietnamese and Sino-Vietnamese antagonisms, and global Sino-Soviet and Soviet-
American rivalries” (see also Chanda, 1989). These rivalries sustained the Cambodian 
conflict for over a decade. In 1988, Hun Sen wrote in an essay that “China was the root of 
everything that was evil in Cambodia” (Jeldres, 2003).  
Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and its satellite states, a 
comprehensive agreement to the Cambodian conflict was reached in 1991. The peace-
agreement led to the 1993 United Nations sponsored elections in Cambodia which 
produced an internationally legitimate government. During the first four years following the 
establishment of the Cambodia’s new government, diplomatic relations between the PRC 
and Cambodia, which was reestablished in 1993, remained mixed. While maintaining 
diplomatic relations with the PRC, the Cambodian government permitted Taiwan to operate 
a liaison office in Phnom Penh. Legitimate and illegitimate businesses from Taiwan grew 
while those from the PRC were limited. The watershed of reestablishing close Sino-Khmer 
relations began in 1997, with Hun Sen’s strategic diplomatic calculation to search for a 
powerful international ally when his international legitimacy was in question following his 
violent ouster of his democratically elected senior coalition partner, Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh. The United Nations Security Council, under pressure from the United States, 
voted the Cambodia seat left vacant in 1997 as a punishment for Hun Sen’s violent grab of 
power. Cambodia’s donors suspended its financial assistance to Cambodia, cutting its 
financial blood supply.  
As a move to offset the decline in international diplomatic and financial support for 
his government, Hun Sen played the China card by “promptly expelled Taiwan’s unofficial 
liaison office from Phnom Penh” (Marks, 2000). This policy pleased the PRC, which in 
1998 offered Hun Sen a reciprocal response of US2.8 million dollars in military assistance. 
In 1999, the PRC provided an additional US18.3 million dollars in foreign assistance and 
US200 million dollars in interest free loans—the largest Chinese assistance to any country 
to that date (Marks, 2000). In response to China’s indifference to Hun Sen’s use of violence 
to consolidate his power, Hun Sen stated:  
Although some international community members have not yet clearly 
understood the real situation in Cambodia, a number of friendly countries have 
maintained their just and fair stance on the Cambodian issue. Among them, the 
PRC, which has firmly adhered to the principle of peaceful coexistence, 
continues to respect the Kingdom of Cambodia's independence and sovereignty 
and does not poke its nose into Cambodian internal affairs (quoted in Marks, 
2000). 
 
 
PRC’s Soft-Power and Cambodia 
 
China’s foreign policy under Moa Zedong stressed self-reliance and the export of 
Maoist revolution abroad, of which Cambodia was an infamous recipient during the second 
half of the 1970s (Quinn, 1992). The outcome was disastrous for recipient countries as well 
as for China. Instead of bringing about economic growth and national prestige, Maoist 
revolution led China to economic disaster and international humiliation and isolation. Since 
China’s Foreign Investment 
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 16, Number 2 
 - 68 -  
 
 
the 1980s following reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping, Chinese foreign policy shifted 
from an ideological to a “ruthless pragmatic” path. This pragmatism centers on a number of 
core principles. First, only “economic prowess”—not ideology or military—can lead China 
on the path to greatness. Second, the route to economic growth can be constructed on the 
principles of peaceful development or global harmony (Pang, 2007; Cho and Jeong, 2008). 
Peaceful development requires the maintenance of good relations with foreign 
governments, reassuring the nations in China’s neighborhood and beyond that China’s rise 
will not be a threat to world order. To advance its foreign policy objective of peaceful 
development, the PRC adopted a new foreign policy tool based on the concept of “soft 
power” or a “charm offensive” (Kurlantzick, 2006 a, b and c; Pang, 2007; Nye, 2005).  
In contrast to “hard power” which is projected through military force, “soft power,” 
according to Joseph Nye, “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others …. [It] is 
the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It 
arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies” (quoted 
in Dambaugh, 2008; see also Nye, 1990). Recently, analysts have discussed other attributes 
of the notion of soft power. Soft power entails not only the attractiveness of a country’s use 
of ideas, culture, and politics, but it also encompasses diplomacy, foreign aid, trade, 
investment, and market access to induce other countries to cooperate with, share or follow 
China’s world view and development model (Lum, Morrison and Vaughn, 2008; Pang, 
2007; Kurlantzick, 2006 a, b, and c).  
To many developing countries, Beijing’s use of soft power has created a new 
ideology, the “Beijing consensus,” which does not require neo-liberal policies to achieve 
economic development. In other words, “an authoritarian political system can be 
maintained while also pursuing high economic growth,” through the adoption of 
developmental state strategy (Cho and Jeong, 2008: 463-64). As far as human rights is 
concerned, Beijing stresses “red rights” a second generation of human rights which 
emphasizes the rights to basic needs such as food, clothing, housing, shelter, and medical 
care. Beijing also stresses differences in historical, cultural, and economic developments 
among world nations to justify its claim that Western style democracy and human rights are 
not suitable for all nations. The Beijing consensus, with its focus on social harmony and 
order, serves as a countervailing force to the previously dominant “Washington consensus,” 
which stressed a market economy with democratic government (Nye, 2005). The Beijing 
consensus is popular with both authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments because in 
their views it produces “win-win” outcomes wherein Beijing can help them attain economic 
growth without interfering in their domestic political affairs.  
The year 2000 was the beginning of the systematic implementation of sophisticated 
PRC diplomacy based on “soft power”, directed largely to the developing world 
(Dambaugh, 2008). As far as developing countries are concerned, China’s soft power 
projected through a “charm offensive” entails “… no interference [meaning] no political 
strings attached…” (Pang, 2007; see also Lum, Morrison and Vaughn, 2008). Kerry 
Dumbaugh (2008, p. 12) describes “no strings attached” by noting, “Chinese money 
generally comes with none of the good governance requirements, human rights conditions, 
approved-project restrictions and environmental quality regulations” commonly found 
attached to aid and investment from Western countries.  
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Since the early 2000s, Cambodia is an illustrative case of the employment of the 
PRC’s new diplomatic soft power. First, China has used a “charm offensive” in the form of 
senior leadership diplomacy. Since the early 2000s, top Chinese officials, including former 
President Jiang Zemin, former Chairman of the National People’s Congress Li Peng, 
former Premier Zhu Rongji, and current Premier Wen Jiabao, have all visited Cambodia 
(Ministry of International Cooperation and Peace, Kingdom of Cambodia, 2009). Each of 
these visits was punctuated with announcements of Chinese economic assistance. For 
instance in 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao announced a US600 million dollar aid package. To 
further legitimize Sino-Khmer diplomatic ties, both Cambodian, and Chinese leaders 
touched the close historical link between revered King Norodom Sihanouk and the PRC’s 
founding fathers—Chairman Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping. 
Further, China has also promoted cultural connections and strengthened its 
relationships with the ethnic Chinese community in Cambodia by providing financial 
assistance for construction of Chinese language schools, publication of Chinese language 
textbooks, and scholarships for Cambodian students to study in China. The Chinese 
government also provided assistance for human resource development by sponsoring 
training programs for Cambodian government officials in China (author’s interview with 
official at the Ministry of International Cooperation and Peace, August 4, 2009; see also 
Kurlantzick, 2006a). Furthermore, China has also funded Cambodia’s prestige construction 
projects, such as the Council of Ministers building and a planned botanical garden. 
More noticeable is Chinese development assistance to Cambodia which has not only 
increased dramatically but also diversified. The increase from 2006 to 2007 was 75%, from 
US53.2 million dollars to US92.4 million dollars (The Cambodian Rehabilitation and 
Development Board of the Council for Development of Cambodia, 2008, p. 8). As of 2007, 
China has extended assistance to Cambodia through internationally coordinated 
mechanisms in line with its commitment to engage in world affairs through bilateral as well 
as international multilateral institutions. In 2007 as part of its expanding involvement in 
multilateral institutions, China offered aid through the Consultative Group—91.5 million 
out of the 689 million total multilateral package to Cambodia (Lum, Morrison, and 
Vaughn, 2008). It is difficult to track China’s aid to foreign countries because it is neither 
“provided in regularized annual allotments” nor publicly revealed for reason of avoiding 
domestic public criticism of wasteful spending in light of domestic needs (Dumbaugh, 
2008). For 2007-2009, on a bilateral basis, China pledged US236 million dollars compared 
to US337 million dollars, and US215 million dollars by Japan and European Union 
respectively (see Table 1). Thus far, China has funded relatively fewer development 
assistance programs; however, when one counts loans and support for public works, 
infrastructure and hydropower projects, China is one of Cambodia’s largest donors. 
 
Table 1: Foreign Aid to Cambodia from key donors 
Countries 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
United 
States 
22.1 
 
34.3 
 
40.6 
 
43.3 
 
51 
 
58.1 
 
54.9 
 
52.7 
 
N/A 
United 
Kingdom 
11.6 
 
15.4 
 
17 
 
20.6 
 
20.7 
 
23.7 
 
37.8 
 
35.3 
 
35.8 
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Korea 
 
22.5 
 
10.3 
 
24.1 
 
14.9 
 
13.3 
 
31.4 
 
12.1 
 
19.6 
 
5.6 
 
Countries 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China 5.7 
 
5.6 
 
32.5 
 
46.6 
 
53.2 
 
92.4 
 
127.9 
 
67.1 
 
47.5 
 
Japan 
 
105.6 
 
101.2 
 
101.8 
 
111.7 
 
103.7 
 
122.1 
 
144.6 
 
53 
 
26.3 
 
EU 
(including 
UK) 
 
108.2 
 
114.7 
 
107.1 
 
130.6 
 
156.1 
 
171.4 
 
201.7 
 
191.5 
 
126.3 
 
UN and 
Multilateral 
aid 
 
191.4 
 
193.4 
 
164.8 
 
187.5 
 
251.2 
 
191.4 
 
297.4 
 
202.9 
 
138.9 
 
 
Source: The Cambodia Aid Effectiveness Report 2008, prepared by the Cambodian 
Rehabilitation and Development Board of the Council for the Development of Cambodia 
for the Second Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF), November 2008, p. 9. 
 
 
According to the United States Congressional Research Service, China has become 
the “primary economic patron” of Cambodia (Lum, Morrison, and Vaughn, 2008). Its 
investments in Cambodia have risen exponentially with over 3,000 companies investing in 
natural resources, agriculture, textiles, and tourism. Information on the nature on Chinese 
firms operating in Cambodia is scarce. Dr. Kao Kim Houn, Secretary of State, Ministry of 
Peace and International Cooperation, indicated in an interview with the author that the 
Cambodian government sometimes does not know whether a Chinese firm is a state-owned 
or a private entity (Phnom Penh, January 23, 09).  However, it should be noted that in 
Cambodia Chinese companies that invest in critical natural resources, construction and 
hydropower plants are state owned, a pattern that reflect China’s industrial investment in 
the developing world and in Africa and Southeast Asia in particular (Wang, 2002). In 
Cambodia these key state-owned companies include Sinohydro Corporation, Chian Yunan 
Corporation for International Techno-Economic Corporation, China Heavy Machinery 
Corp., China Southern Power Grid Company, China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), Guangdong Chenguan Enterprise Investment Group, and China National 
Machinery and Equipment Import & Export Corporation (Middleson, 2008a; Global 
Witness, 2009; Middleson, 2008b; Barney, 2005). Anecdotal evidence shows that private 
Chinese companies also conducted trade in Cambodia and invested in various sectors of 
Cambodian economy such as restaurants, tourism, gambling, and fitness club. 
Chinese investment in Cambodia climbed from just 17 million or 1.3 percent of total 
domestic and foreign registered capital and fixed assets in 1994 to 688,737,099 million or 
43.12 percent of total domestic and foreign registered capital and fixed assets in 2005 
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(Hing, 2006: 205-216). Chinese investment continued to soar and reached just slightly 
under four billion dollars in 2008. Such dramatic increases make China by far the largest 
investor in Cambodia. (See Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Foreign Investments from Key Countries 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
United 
States 
194,426,48
0 
114,380,500 11,187,260 99,626,186.8 6,861,645 24,051,87
5 
15,276,8
03 
11,686,6
50 
Thailand 7,142,150 207,596,571 533,807,88
9 
34,757,898 86,572,266 36,618,92
7 
43,467,3
05 
17,859,7
01 
Vietnam N/A 369,499.2 N/A N/A 871,030 1,002,540 N/A N/A 
Malaysia 1,417,000 2762881067.1
5 
249,075,42
1 
118,708,924.
5 
147,301,97
8 
30,866,72
0 
3,823,80
0 
78,489,6
14 
Singapor
e 
94,870,800 145,794,981 64,885,646 27,697,278 33,261,340 3,331,185 11,188,8
16 
N/A 
United 
Kingdom 
12,125,000 274051592 442,512,31
6 
13,990,907 856,990 3,703,302 23,216,4
21 
3,533,22
9 
Korea N/A 1,220,130 9,455,100 247,139,194 8,452,328 N/A 29,321,1
81 
4,088,69
0 
China 17,000,000 7,502,387 404,267,93
1 
58,019,499 179,553,15
4 
82,462,38
4 
32,355,0
61 
9,314,74
5 
Taiwan 1,215,000 21,943,300 288,605,35
5 
90,720,846 223,202,20
5 
84,832,63
1 
35,241,9
29 
92,632,9
89 
Hong 
Kong 
7,306,781.
51 
129,219,992 34,481,855 86,551,155 138,787,63
8 
52,249,78
4 
8,862,92
5 
 1,934,076
Japan N/A 1,432,500 14,043,150 609,315 3,371,800 4,593,808 424,997 N/A 
 
 
Foreign Investment (continued) 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 2007* 2008* 
United 
States 
N/A N/A 4,554,852 6,568,285 66.47 9.39 680.09
Thailand N/A 9,968,512 3,050,000 96,094,039 110.12 121.4
8 
94.58
Vietnam 24,465,09
5 
N/A N/A N/A 34.21 185.6
0 
28.35
Malaysia 2,006,660 8,782,485 29,092,350 36,564,993 30.83 261.2
0 
3.65
Singapor
e 
11,000,00
0 
7,005,050 6,719,352 30,721,880 15.31 3.04 64.46
United 
Kingdom 
1,014,525 1,005,000 3,166,126 7400,000 4.54 27.15 7.10
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Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 2007* 2008* 
Korea 86,578,35
0 
3,468,915 8,100,450 71,665,651 1,014.3
1 
170.0
7 
1,259.5
8 
China 32,880,13
0 
48,230,61
8 
102,214,16
3 
689,737,09
9 
745.40 220.7
6 
3,976.0
9 
Taiwan 11,795,33
0 
2,340,200 18,287,581 14,543,289 64.09 53.93 24.85
Hong 
Kong 
8,584,490 6,450,000 N/A 1,749,972 5.57 26.35 N/A
Japan 3,390,000 N/A 2,886,814 N/A 3.10 120.6
2 
12.43
Source: *is taken from the Cambodian Investment Board of the Council for the 
Development of Cambodia, 2006, 2007, 2008; additional data is from Hing Thoraxy, The 
Cambodian Investment Challenges in Global Competitiveness (Phnom Penh: 2006), pp. 
205-216. 
 
 
China waived tariffs for over 400 products from Cambodia, over 90 percent of which 
are agricultural goods and raw materials (Heinrich Boll, WWF and IISD, 2008, p. 3). 
Bilateral trade between China and Cambodia reached 933 million in 2007, though the 
balance of trade heavily favors China. In 2007, China exports to Cambodia amounted to 
882 million, while the latter’s export to the former was only 51 million (Xinhua, 2008). 
China’s largest investment in Cambodia is in hydropower plants, entailing cumulative 
investments of approximately one billion dollars (Fullbrook, 2009). Four hydropower 
plants have been constructed or are under construction while 19 other dam projects are 
undergoing feasibility studies (Middleton, 2008). China has also invested in the 
development of a special economic zone in the port city of Sihanoukville with projected 
completion by 2015. This special economic zone, when finished, is expected to house some 
300 companies with 80,000 job opportunities and US2 billion dollars in export revenues 
projected (ASEANAffairs, 2008). Furthermore, China has also invested in agribusiness—
many of the projects are in joint partnership with Cambodian businesses. Another of 
China’s major investments in Cambodia is in the garment sector. 
 
 
 
China’s Investment and Assistance 
A Win-Win Situation? 
 
Analyses of China’s intentions in Cambodia vary. One theory postulates Cambodia 
has been incorporated into China’s grand security strategy in an anticipated multi-polar 
world—one which is centered around China (Schmidt, 2006). Cambodia’s seaport of 
Sihanoukville can serve as one location in a “string of pearls”, strategic locations from 
which to secure vulnerable sea-lanes of communication and protect seaborne energy 
supplies. China also plans to use the seaport at Sihanoukville particularly for the delivery 
point for oil imports from the Middle East (Story, 2006; Perlez, 2006). Furthermore, in 
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conforming to China’s 10th Five Year Plan (beginning in 2001) which considers the 
Mekong region as a top priority, China in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank 
funded infrastructural development projects such as roads, rails and bridges in the Greater 
Sub-Mekong region that link Cambodia and the rest of peninsular Southeast Asia to its 
Southwestern land-locked region to mitigate uneven economic growth that has over the past 
three decades favored China’s coastal region (Schmidt, 2006, p. 48-49). This infrastructure 
has contributed substantially to Cambodia’s economic transformation. It has linked 
previously remote Cambodian provinces to not only the country’s economic center but also 
the broader Southeast Asian economy and beyond.  
Another objective of China’s assistance in Cambodia and in other developing 
countries is to proudly promote its culture, language and civilization, projected as culturally 
deterministic nationalism (Hua, 2009; Cho and Jeong, 2008). China’s assistance to 
Cambodia aims at promoting the study of Chinese culture and language, particularly among 
Sino-Khmer. A former Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia, Yan Tingai, once stated: 
“popularization of the Chinese language in Cambodia far exceeds that in any other 
Southeast Asian country. This feather in the cap of Cambodia’s Chinese has made an 
enormous contribution to both glorifying Chinese culture and developing the friendship 
between Cambodia and China” (Marks, 2000). China also established a FM radio station 
whose broadcast focuses on teaching Mandarin and Chinese history. 
Cambodia’s ruling party—the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)—has also gained 
substantially from China’s investments and assistance. The CPP has gained legitimacy 
through its investment in infrastructure, particularly bridges and roads, with funding from 
multilateral institutions and bilateral agencies. Funding from these institutions—even 
though crucial—are insufficient to address Cambodia’s infrastructure needs; and the 
Cambodian government is often frustrated by the imposed conditions of this aid. China’s 
economic assistance not only injects additional needed funding to infrastructure 
development, but it is also less troublesome. Middleson (2008b, p. 44) expressed this issue 
succinctly: 
The reality is that many borrowing governments, including the Cambodian 
government, are pleased to accept Chinese support, mainly for the construction of 
physical infrastructure that dispenses with burdensome and costly environmental and 
social safeguard standards in order to accelerate their economic development. The 
Chinese government considers even serious human rights abuses an internal affair. As 
such, grants and loans through which the Chinese State Council’s foreign policies are 
implemented are not attached to conditionalities on good governance. 
As part of the PRC’s “going out strategy,” the Chinese government promotes Chinese 
FDI manufacturing in host countries of light industrial goods such as textiles, machinery 
and electrical equipment that could process Chinese raw materials (Wong and Chen, 2003). 
This pattern is reflected in Chinese companies’ investment in the garment sector, which is 
the backbone of Cambodian exports and serves as a primary source of employment. This 
sector contributed 80 percent of recorded exports, provided 350,000 jobs, and added 2% to 
Cambodia’s GDP since 1995. Furthermore, the garment sector has also generated 
thousands of jobs in indirect employment. Remittances sent by garment factory workers 
have transformed many rural villages where recipients have been able to invest in 
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agricultural production resulting in a higher standard of living. In addition to its 
contributions to Cambodia’s overall economic growth, the garment sector also serves as a 
model for good labor practices which have won approval from both importing countries 
and conscientious consumers in the West (Ear, forthcoming). 
Furthermore, China’s investment in hydro-power plants helps the Cambodian 
government toward achieving its economic development plan, which includes the provision 
of cheap reliable electricity as a major component not only for industrial zones but also for 
rural Cambodia. Currently, only 20% of households have access to electricity and the 
government plans to increase that number to 70% by 2030 (Middleson, 2008b, pp. 25-26). 
Furthermore, on top of other issues such as infrastructure bottlenecks and poor governance, 
businesses cite high electricity costs as an obstacle to doing business in Cambodia. At 
present, Cambodia buys electricity from Vietnam and Thailand, but it has plans to reverse 
these trends following the completion of several major hydropower plants. The demand for 
electricity in Thailand will increase by 50% by 2021, while that demand in Vietnam will 
quadruple by 2015, surges that will be unmet by domestic supply (Middleton, 2008a). 
Therefore, Chinese investment in hydropower plants will reduce the price of electricity and 
increase the availability of electricity in rural areas. The increase in electricity supply and 
infrastructure improvement will further develop Cambodia’s economy, while strengthening 
the CPP’s popularity and legitimacy. 
 
 
A Negative Effect? 
 
Many critics argue that the Chinese government uses its influence and financial 
assistance to promote Chinese companies and Chinese interests (Kurlantzick, 2006a, 
2006b, 2006c). There are grounds for suspicion given the nature of Chinese companies’ 
involvement in Cambodia, the secrecy of the bidding process for contracts for minerals 
rights, hydropower plants and economic land concessions. Foreign diplomats believe that 
“backroom deals” for Chinese companies do exist (McDermid and Sam, 2006). These 
backroom deals tend to exist in strategic sectors such as agro-businesses, minerals and oil 
which China considered critical for sustainable economic growth. 
The Cambodian government denies this allegation. Dr. Kao Kim Houn, Secretary of 
State, Ministry of Peace and International Cooperation, Kingdom of Cambodia, contends 
that analysts and the press overreact to China’s involvement in Southeast Asia in general 
and in Cambodia in particular (interview with author, Phnom Penh, January 2009). Overall, 
the Chinese government fulfills the need of the Cambodian government and given their 
shared philosophy on politics and economic development there appears to be little friction 
between them. An official of a multilateral institution stated that “China goes to recipient 
countries doing what they want. The Cambodian government wants infrastructure, so the 
Chinese government builds infrastructure for Cambodia (interview with author, Phnom 
Penh, January 2009). 
However, it should be noted that China’s assistance and investment in resource rich 
areas around the globe serves “to facilitate preferential access to such resources, especially 
oil” (Medeiros, 2006). One of the key objectives of outward foreign direct investment 
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(OFDI) is to acquire natural resources to meet the ever increasing demand for natural 
resources that are not fully met by domestic sources (Cai, 1999). A large proportion of 
China’s OFDI, which amounts to US16 billion dollars, was in mining and energy (Henrich 
Boll, WWF and IISD, 2008, pp. 1-2).  
China’s investment in Cambodia is no exception, the focus is on resource exploration 
and extraction. Many of these projects, critics argue, do not take into account the impact on 
human rights and the environment. “China’s goal is to extract natural resources to serve its 
commercial purposes. Thus, rather than a ‘win-win’ situation,” Sam Rainsy, President of 
Cambodia’s main opposition party, said “China’s engagement produces a situation of ‘win-
win-lose’ in which corrupt officials win and the unscrupulous investors win, but the 
Cambodian people lose” (McDermid and Sam, 2006). One western diplomat concurred, 
comparing the Chinese companies to “locust” who “consume natural resources, animals, 
minerals” disregarding “environmental protection” (McDermid and Sam, 2006).  
The investments in agricultural plantations and hydropower plants is another good 
example. A Chinese state owned company, Fuchan, in partnership with Cambodian 
Pheapimex, developed an agricultural plantation in the northeastern province of Mondulkiri 
covering an area of 300,000 hectares. Another Chinese state-owned company, China 
Cooperative State Farm Group, in a joint venture with Pheapimex, developed a vast area in 
Kampong Chhnang and Pursat provinces. These companies did not produce an 
Environmental Impact Assessment as required by law. The impact of these joint ventures 
on local communities is extremely severe, including: population displacement, loss of 
access to land and resources, food insecurity and impoverishment (Middleson, 2008 b; 
Global Witness, 2007; Barney 2005). Another Chinese state affiliated firm, Wuzhishan LS, 
was accused by human rights groups of colluding with Cambodian government officials to 
grab land from indigenous peoples (Kurlantzick, 2006a). A Chinese SOE, the Everbright 
Group—as documented by the environmental watchdog, Global Witness—violated 
Cambodia’s Environmental and Forestry Laws and infringed on local communities’ 
livelihoods (Global Witness, 2003).  
Furthermore, through joint ventures, these Chinese SOEs strengthened the financial 
positions of Cambodian business tycoons. These tycoons have formed a symbiotic relation 
with the ruling CPP whose electoral success and legitimacy rest on vast networks of mass 
based patronage sustained largely by financial contributions from Cambodian business 
tycoons (Un 2005; Un and So, forthcoming).  
 China’s investment in hydropower plants is yet another example, according to 
critics, of the country’s disregard for the impact its investments have upon local people and 
the environment. The examination of the final decision of the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) to withdraw funding from investment in a hydropower 
project—the Kamchay Dam—illuminates the difference between Chinese and western 
practices as far as human rights and environment is concerned. In the early 1990s, CIDA 
conducted a feasibility study of the Kamchay Dam. Although the agency confirmed the 
economic feasibility of the project, it withdrew from the project following pressure from a 
coalition of Cambodian and international non-governmental organizations who view the 
social and environmental costs of the project far exceeding its benefits (Middleson, 2008b, 
p. 59).  
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Chinese companies and their funders feel no such pressure. Middleson of the 
International Rivers writes that: “In many cases, very little detail is publicly available 
regarding the projects [hydropower plants] themselves, the agreement reached between the 
Cambodian government and the project developer, and the potential social and 
environmental impacts” (Middleson, 2008b, p. 28). A major funder for the hydropower 
plant in Cambodia is the China Export-Import Bank. Although the Bank adopted 
environmental policies in November 2004 regarding its financing of construction projects, 
“[T]here remains, however, little evidence of the guidelines for rigorous implementation on 
the ground to date” (Middleson, 2008a; see also Middleson 2008b, p. 46). As a result, 
hydropower dams have been constructed in protected national forests potentially flooding 
animal sanctuaries and precious tropical ecosystems. 
However, it should be noted that the rise of Chinese investment in Cambodia is not 
attributed straightforwardly to Chinese pressure as some critics have charged. First, 
Chinese companies’ successes in securing investments in Cambodia are partly facilitated by 
shared values between Chinese investors and Cambodian business communities dominated 
by Sino-Khmers. Fareed Zakaria (2008, p. 103) characterizes this phenomenon: “few 
Chinese have really internalized the notion that abstract rules, laws, and contracts are more 
important than a situational analysis of a case at hand ….” He further states that “[s]ocial 
relations and trust are far more important than paper commitments” (Zakaria, 2008, p. 112). 
The lack of transparency, rules and regulations in conducting business in Cambodia have 
prevented many Western companies from investing in Cambodia (a Western Business and 
legal consultant, interview with author, January 2007; a senior Western diplomat, interview 
with author, August 4, 2009). However, such an environment does not deter Chinese 
companies whose business collaborations with their Sino-Khmer counterparts are based on 
mutual trust and experience in operating in a non-transparent and corrupt environment in 
their own country (Johnston, 2005; particularly chapter 7). As elsewhere in Southeast Asia 
(see for example Yoshihara, 1988 and Yeung 2000), in the role of ethnic Chinese in 
facilitating and collaborating investment is crucial because of their political-economic ties 
with the ruling elites who exercise discretion in awarding contracts and granting permits for 
businesses. 
Emerging markets, such as Cambodia, are often considered risky by Western and 
typical shared holder companies whose investments generally focus on short term return of 
profit. Many Chinese enterprises operating overseas, including in Cambodia, are either state 
owned or affiliated. These companies receive financial backing from state-owned financial 
institutions such as the China Export Import Bank and the China Development Bank to 
promote Chinese investment in apparently risky markets. These banks “largely implement 
the macroeconomic policies and political directions of the Chinese central government” 
(Middleson, 2008b, 43). As a result, these enterprises can adopt a longer term risky 
business horizon, foregoing short term benefits for long term gains, a practice that private 
Western companies are not willing to undertake (Official of a multilateral institution, 
interview with author, January 2009). 
 
 
China’s Assistance and Investment: An Impediment to Democratic Promotion? 
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For China, aid is “value neutral.” Such neutrality, according to many critics, can 
block efforts for the promotion of democracy, sustainable and inclusive development and 
environmental protection. In other words, much of China’s assistance worldwide tends to 
perpetuate the status quo of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes (Zakaria, 2008, 
pp. 118-119). Referring to China’s involvement in Southeast Asia, Joshua Kurlantzick 
argues that soft-power allows China to have growing influence, though with potentially dire 
consequences “for a region of nascent democracies and weak civil societies,” undertaking 
efforts to develop democracy and establish the rule of law and good governance 
(Kurlantzick, 2006c). 
In Cambodia, it is argued that Chinese investment and assistance strengthen the 
ruling CPP because such investment and assistance offer the Cambodian ruling party a 
cushion against pressure from Western donors and international financial institutions which 
otherwise would have been able to use the Cambodian government for meaningful political 
reform (Sullivan, forthcoming). Since 1993, Western countries have provided billions of 
dollars for economic rehabilitation and promotion of good governance. Over a decade later, 
the Cambodian government has, as Duncan McCargo (2007) suggests, gotten “away with 
authoritarianism.” By examining the Prime Minister Hun Sen’s rhetoric on the neutrality of 
China’s aid to Cambodia, it can easily be assumed that China’s influence counters Western 
intervention in Cambodia, particularly over the latter’s efforts to promote good 
governance—a rubric term for judicial, political and anti-corruption reforms. The argument 
is that Western donors’ adoption of a firmer stance on governance issues by threatening to 
link aid to reform outcomes “will push Cambodia further into the pockets of its biggest 
donor—China” (Global Witness, 2009). Under these circumstances, Western donors have 
to soften their stance when dealing with the Cambodian government.  
This author’s conversation with officials of multilateral institutions and the 
Cambodian government indicated that Western donors in fact have limited influence on the 
Cambodian government. China’s assistance to and investment in Cambodia, according to 
an influential senior Western diplomat, “is not necessarily an impediment” to the promotion 
of democracy and human rights in Cambodia. However, the diplomat added, such aid and 
investment does offer the Cambodian government more “confidence” in dealing with 
Western donors (interview with the author, Phnom Penh, August 4, 2009). The 
fundamental problem is not so much the PRC’s engagement in Cambodia as much as the 
donors’ lack a unified, consistent and forceful voice when dealing with the Cambodian 
government (Ray, 2007; Dr. Koa, interview with author January 23, 2009). Given the lack 
of unity within the donor community and Cambodia’s imbedded neo-patrimonial politics, 
the ruling CPP has been able to adopt a selective response toward political reform. They 
accommodated donors’ pressure to reform certain sectors—such as social services and 
health—which do not threaten their power base and personal economic interests (Hughes 
and Un, 2007 and Hughes and Un, forthcoming). At the same time, they resist reforming 
areas that potentially undermine their grip on power, such as governance, the judiciary and 
anti-corruption laws. Such patterns will likely continue, I would argue, with or without 
China’s investment or assistance. 
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Conclusion 
 
This article has documented the surge in overseas assistance and inflow of FDI from 
China to Cambodia over the past sixteen years. This rise forms part of Beijing’s foreign 
policy strategy—increasingly recognized as the “Beijing Consensus”—wherein Beijing 
uses its newly acquired economic power (financial assistance, investment and market 
access) to gain political support from developing countries and access to their natural 
resources. This strategy is based on, according to Beijing, the principle that financial 
assistance, investment and market access is value neutral; therefore, they should not be 
linked to any conditions, as is often practiced within the framework of the Washington 
Consensus.  
However, critics charge that the hidden agenda and interests imbedded in Beijing’s 
notion of neutrality has negative implications for recipient countries in general and under 
this investigation, Cambodia. While China’s investment in resource exploration and 
extraction in Cambodia has infringed on the local environment and human rights, its 
financial aid and investment have blocked efforts by internal as well as external actors to 
promote democracy, the rule of law and human rights in Cambodia. 
The truth of the matter is more complex and appears more positive than critics have 
charged. China’s investment and assistance have helped transformed Cambodia’ economic 
landscape bringing more prosperity—of course unevenly and with a certain degree of 
human rights abuses—as they link Cambodia’s peripheral areas to its core and Cambodia as 
a whole to regional and global economies. The charge that Cambodia’s authoritarian 
trajectory a by product of China’s engagement is only partially accurate. With or without 
China’s pressure, the Beijing Consensus is appealing to the Cambodian ruling elite who 
share the belief in state developmentalism—economic prosperity with tight political 
control. Cambodian elites’ defiance of Western efforts to promote deeper democratization 
existed even before the presence of China’s investment and development assistance as 
evidenced in the 1997 CPP’s coup against FUNCINPEC, a violent consolidation of power 
in the midst of western intervention. 
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